The new regionalism tends to emphasize the commonalities of central cities and their suburbs. Los Angeles County has surprisingly minor differences between central city and suburb-leading one to wonder why municipal alliances across jurisdictional lines have not been more prominent. The author tackles this anomaly by breaking L.A. County into 58 different areas and tracking demographic and economic change between 1970 and 1990. The analysis suggests that there are important differences in the ethnic and economic dynamics of various subregions. As a result, "smart-growth" politics may have less salience in Los Angeles than would an alternative regionalism rooted in community-based movements and organizations.
analysts whose central concern is social equity have argued that community developers need to "think and link" to the larger regional polity and economy (Nowak 1997; Jargowsky 1997; Pastor et al. 2000; Rusk 1999 ). Adding to the potential for city-suburban links is a simple demographic fact: The increasing rates of suburbanization among African-Americans and Latinos mean that older inner-ring suburbs have begun to look more-and could politically act more-like the central city (Orfield 1997 (Orfield , 1998 Frey and Fielding 1995; Frey 1998; Jargowsky 1998) .
In many ways, the Los Angeles metropolitan area would seem to be an ideal candidate for a progressive regional agenda that crosses city and suburban lines. The disparity between suburban and city population growth, the usual sign of a central city disconnected from its immediate neighbors, has been quite small (see Table 1 ). Although the worst aspects of the region's long-term economic restructuring-such as poverty, low incomes, and slow job growth-have often been felt most sharply by city residents, the gaps with the rest of the county are not that large. Significantly, the racial composition of the city of Los Angeles is also not that different than the rest of L.A. County, and ethnic change in the past several decades has been even more pronounced outside of the city. Yet a new regionalist agenda, at least along the lines of Orfield's (1997) attempts to link the fates of inner-ring suburbs and the central city, has largely failed to emerge in Southern California. Certain subregional groups, such as the cities centered around the L.A. ports or some municipalities in the ethnic mosaic of the San Gabriel Valley, have found common ground on a limited set of economic development policies, but the central city of Los Angeles is often at policy odds with its neighbors. Within Los Angeles itself, leaders in the San Fernando Valley have threatened to secede, and a recent controversy over management of the city's school district has given momentum to secessionist efforts in other neighborhoods.
With municipal actors standing to a side, regionalist efforts focused on equity between various communities and social actors have instead been undertaken by more traditional constituencies such as labor unions and activist community-based organizations. Through the latter part of the 1990s, for example, the L.A.-based Labor/Community Strategy Center has organized bus riders to challenge the regional transportation authority on the grounds that its spending on rail has shortchanged the largely minority ridership of the most overcrowded bus system in the country. The labor movement has also taken a regional approach and scored some surprising victories, including in April 2000, when 8,500 janitors, covering office buildings from Santa Monica to Los Angeles to Glendale, undertook a successful strike for higher wages that garnered the sympathies of the broad public. With several other examples easily at hand (see Pastor et al. forthcoming) , some analysts have suggested that the area has become home to a new movement for "growth with equity," which crosses racial and often geographic lines. 2 Although a significant part of this pattern-more forward progress on what might be termed community-or labor-based regionalism than on the municipal links envisioned by Orfield and others-may reflect the relative strengths at coalition building of certain political and community leaders, there is also a structural explanation: The boundaries of Los Angeles City and the surrounding county may not reflect regional breakdowns relevant to municipal-based regional organizing. After all, the central city of Los Angeles has its own "internal" suburbs-that is, areas which are demographically and economically closer to the traditional suburban profile-whereas natural allies in the adjoining cities and unincorporated county territory in south and southeast Los Angeles, areas also hard-hit by the recession of the early 1990s, are located in different political jurisdictions. Although reaching across these lines could be done by municipal actors, in Los Angeles, more seems to have occurred on the activist or community level-and an analysis that breaks up both the city and county of Los Angeles into many different subareas may help illuminate both the challenges and the possibilities.
3 I seek to do this by offering a novel use of the 1990 Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs). Specifically, I use detailed information to construct the 1990 PUMA shapes and boundaries, connect these to reconciled tract shapes and data for the 1970, 1980, and 1990 census years, and then take the PUMA shapes back through the census years to explore certain demographic and economic changes over time. In considering these dynamics, I offer two new breakdowns of "neighborhoods" or "areas" in the county. The first is based on a historic definition of inner-city areas (by including certain inner-ring suburbs and excluding L.A. City's own suburbs); the second classifies subareas by degree and type of ethnic change. These classifications, particularly the latter, reveal an ongoing "suburbanization" and a growing inequality between neighborhood types. Although the pattern suggests that the usually proposed central-city/suburb alliances may be difficult, it also suggests certain commonalities by race and economic experience that may help explain the basis for certain subregional groupings (such as in southeast L.A.) as well as the community-based but regionally focused social justice movements that have emerged in recent years.
This article proceeds as follows. I begin by exploring central-city/suburban differences, comparing Los Angeles with the rest of the country. I then explain the basic data strategy taken to recompose the region for analytical purposes. I then explore the patterns shown by a finer breakdown of subareas in L.A. County, first by "inner city" and suburbs and second by degree and type of ethnic change. I then turn to an account of the evolution of neighborhood difference, supplementing a short history with a brief econometric analysis of the determinants of demographic change. The final section returns to the issue of political alliances and directions, with special attention to the implications for "new regionalist" or "smart-growth" movements.
CITY AND SUBURB IN LOS ANGELES
The usual story of urban decline is straightforward: For various reasons, including federal subsidies for sprawl, the central city is abandoned by the wealthy and the white; employment and commercial growth follow the population exodus to outlying areas, creating problems of spatial mismatch for the inner-city poor; and as a result of these processes, central cities spiral downward and suburbanites prosper (Wilson 1996; Jargowsky 1997) . Of course, the new literature on city-suburban economics warn us that such gains will only be relative-suburbs generally fare worst when their central city is in decline (Savitch et al. 1993; Voith 1992 Voith , 1998 )-but the general tale of separating fates and racial isolation remains a salient one, especially for many East Coast and midwestern cities.
Many analysts and activists have sought to bridge the resulting gap between poor communities and their surrounding regions. In his seminal book Metropolitics, Myron Orfield (1997) stressed potential common interests between leaders in the central city and older inner-ring suburbs, noting that the latter areas are themselves suffering from economic dislocations and a rising presence of poor and minority residents. Orfield has argued for regional revenue sharing, noting that "high-wealth," low-need suburbs could provide the resources necessary to help their central-city and inner-ring neighbors handle the fiscal strain of poverty and high-need schoolchildren. David Rusk (1999) also stressed the need to link city-suburb fates in Inside Game, Outside Game: In a striking analysis of poor neighborhoods, he found that locally focused community development efforts generally have quite modest economic impacts (compared with regional forces) and instead suggested that central cities should form alliances with neighboring suburbs.
Within these "new regionalist" frameworks, the main agents for reform are generally municipal actors, especially various mayors and city managers who may find may common economic, environmental, and social ground in stopping sprawl and resteering growth to the inner city. This focus on municipal-level actors has also been a characteristic of the emerging smart-growth movement, which stresses the need to coordinate land-use decisions and shift federal, state, and city tax policy and infrastructural investment.
If demographic and economic commonalities make for common interest, Los Angeles would seem to be a perfect locale for the city-suburb alliances implicit in the new regionalist and smart-growth frameworks. The city of L.A. is only about 6% less Anglo than the county in which it sits; the suburbs actually have a higher percentage of Asians than the city itself, and African-Americans and Latinos are nearly as present outside the city as within it. 4 Population growth has been slower in the city than in the suburbs, but the difference over 20 years is quite small. The class mix (i.e., the percentage of blue-collar residents) is similar in the city and outside. There are significant gaps in some economic variables-poverty is about 6 percentage points higher and job growth 20 percentage points lower in the city-but income is only about 8% lower in the central city than in the rest of the county. Indeed, central-city/suburb differentiation is much less in Los Angeles than in other U.S. metro areas. Drawing on the "The State of the Nation's Cities" (SNC), a database compiled by Glickman, Lahr, and Wyly, I compared the Los Angeles metropolitan statistical area (MSA) to 22 other MSAs with a large central city.
6 Table 2 looks at the relative (central city vs. the overall metro area) percentage minority, household income, home value, poverty rates, unemployment, manufacturing, inequality, and income growth: As can be seen, the central city of Los Angeles generally has more in common with the rest of its metro area than do other central cities with their respective metro areas.
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At the suggestion of a referee, I also compare Los Angeles with selected metro areas. Los Angeles is America's second largest central city after New York, with New York being anomalous because of its sheer size and because a disproportionate share of its metro population (well over 80%) lives in its geographically spread central city. I therefore compare Los Angeles to the metro areas of the next three largest central cities, all of which have a share of the metro population in the central city more comparable with that of L.A.: Those city-regions are Chicago, Houston, and Philadelphia. Although Los Angeles is in the middle with regard to the population share in the central city, it is the least likely to have a central-city population that is more minority, suggesting more homogeneity between city and suburb. L.A.'s central city also has the highest relative household income and per capita income growth and the most balance between central-city and suburban poverty rates, unemployment rates, and general income inequality.
8 Interestingly, the dissimilarity indices for Anglo residential proximity to African-Americans or Latinos are the second highest in this small group, but the African-American/Latino dissimilarity index is the lowest. This proximity suggests that organizing across black-brown lines may have special importance and potential salience in L. A. 9 The fact that L.A.'s demographic, class, and income variables are less skewed along city-metro lines than in the rest of the nation leads one to wonder: Where are the geographic inequalities that many analysts suggest helped trigger the civil unrest of 1992 (Johnson et al. 1992; Ong and Lawrence 1995; Pastor 1995) ? Los Angeles is indeed marked by cleavages of distress, but they do not cut in a simple fashion between the central city and its suburbs. As can be gleaned from the tract-level picture of poverty in Figure 1 , the city of L.A. has pockets of opulence, but areas with severe economic difficulties extend well beyond city boundaries, stretching through the unincorporated areas and inner-ring suburbs of southern and eastern Los Angeles, as well as in parts of the San Fernando and San Gabriel Valleys. And although the rest of the county is about as minority as the city itself, metro-level residential dissimilarity indices are higher than the national average (see Table 2 ), suggesting that residential segregation exists more within, not between, the usual jurisdictional lines. In short, the relative balance between city and suburban demographics and economics in the county may mask as much as it reveals about L.A.'s political economy.
ANOTHER APPROACH: ANALYTICAL FRAME AND BASIC DATA
What, then, is the appropriate level of analysis to find differing patterns of distress across geography? One usual strategy is the census tract, the unit used in building the geographic coverage of poverty in Figure 1 . But the median tract in L.A. County is only about a half square mile and contains fewer than 5,000 residents, hardly the scale of a localized job or retail market. In this study, I focus instead on Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs), the geographic tag used in the U.S. Census Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS).
10 As can be seen from Figure 2 and the detailed list in Table 3 , Los Angeles County had 58 different PUMAs in 1990 that were generally geographically compact and followed recognizable historical, social, and political boundaries. 11 Populations within each PUMA averaged around 150,000, whereas jobs within each PUMA averaged slightly less than 80,000, making them a reasonable scale for examining the localized labor, retail, and economic development trends central to new regionalist concerns.
PUMAs have not generally been used for historical analysis, mostly because 1990 was the first year that such a specific geographic identifier was used for the PUMS data. Prior to the 1990s, individuals were tagged by "county block group": In 1980, there were only three of these in L.A. County, and in 1970, the county block group consisted of all of L.A. County. The usual approach to linking data over time would involve working forward using the largest common denominator-that is, the single-county coverage of 1970. This, however, would eliminate the possibility for examining subarea demographic change.
I therefore tagged all 1990 census tracts with their 1990 PUMA characterization and then linked this to a limited set of data series from the 1970 and 1980 censuses, which had been reallocated into the 1990 tract shapes.
12,13 I then mapped the PUMAs back into the 1980 and 1970 censuses and tracked the changes in these 58 different areas over time.
14 I also matched an employment database available at the tract level in 1980 and 1990, using this to calculate job growth and changes in job density. I should stress that these figures represent actual jobs in a particular area and not necessarily the employment status of the residents of that area; as such, they are useful for calculating the job-density and job-growth measures key to the spatial mismatch component of the "declining central-city" story.
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Merged at the PUMA level, these various series on population and employment comprise the basic data set used in this study. The demographic figures reported throughout are weighted by population; thus, the number for population growth in the central city reflects the increase over the whole base in that area rather than the arithmetic mean of the 21 PUMAs contained within it. In practice, such weighting has little effect on demographic composition, but it does appropriately dampen the growth rates; by contrast, when unweighted, fast growth in a low-population suburb can raise the mean for the suburban group, even if its contribution to the entire suburban populace is minimal. The percentage poor is also weighted by population, the percentage blue collar is weighted by the labor force, and job growth is weighted by the initial job base. Household income and housing values are unweighted; they are derived at the PUMA levels as the average tract median, then calculated for the central city and other geographic categories as the average of these averages. All together, these provide a basis for revealing the patterns of distress and potential for alliances by subareas in the county.
MAPPING DIFFERENCE
With the demographic and employment data in place, I used the PUMAs to create several new ways to break up and therefore understand Los Angeles County. The first was simply a new inner-city/suburb split, based on various historical readings of what did and did not constitute the inner city or core areas of Los Angeles in 1970. 16 The second took into account patterns of demographic change by PUMA on the grounds that this was a basis for both geographic divisions and coalitional commonalities.
Starting with the first breakdown, the inner city was considered to include the following city communities: Eagle Rock, Glassell Park, El Sereno, Highland Park, Lincoln Heights, Boyle Heights, Downtown, Central Avenue- Figure 3) shows a geography more typical of eastern urban areas-a central "inner" city surrounded by a ring of suburbs.
As we see in Table 5 , the demographic and economic characterizations are also more typical of the East and of the rest of the metro-area profiles in Tables 2 and 3 . The "inner city" is far more minority, blue collar, and poor. Both house values and household income are significantly below the rest of Los Angeles County. Job growth is a staggering 29 percentage points lower in the inner city and indeed was negative over the time period considered.
As with the broader comparisons of Table 2 , one standout feature of Los Angeles remains its demographics across the metro area. Note that population growth is not that different between the inner city and the suburbs; indeed, inner-city growth was more rapid, reflecting both higher birth rates and increased immigration.
17 Interestingly, African-Americans have left the central city and enhanced their presence in the suburbs, making Latinos and Asians the new key minority groups in the inner city. Still, the Asian presence has grown more outside the inner city, partly reflecting the tendency of new Asian immigrants to skip the traditional central-city ports of entry and enter the United States via suburban routes. Latinos constitute the group that has raised its presence most in the inner city; however, because the change in Latino presence between 1970 and 1990 was much less when we broke the county up into L.A. City and rest of county, this suggests that Latino growth has been particularly strong in the inner-ring suburbs-especially in South L.A.-that I have considered here as part of the "inner city."
A second recharacterization of the Los Angeles area makes use of these subpatterns of demographic change. As noted in the introduction, some analysts have focused special attention on the demographic transition in the suburbs, arguing that the increased minority presence outside the central city may facilitate links and coalition building with inner-city concerns and actors (Frey 1998; Frey and Fielding 1995) . To pursue this analysis, I calculated the demographic/ethnic character of each of the PUMAs for 1970, 1980, and The clustering of the observations suggests five neighborhood types: (1) currently Anglo and stayed Anglo between 1970 and 1990, (2) predominantly ethnic and stayed ethnic over the 1970 to 1990 period, (3) currently ethnic and underwent a significant transition during the 1970 to 1990 period, (4) currently predominantly ethnic and underwent an "average" transition (for an increasingly ethnic county) over the period, and (5) currently predominantly Anglo and underwent an average transition over the period. Table 6 offers a full listing of the PUMAs in these various categories, and Figure 5 maps the areas of transition and stasis.
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The demographic and economic differences for this breakdown are offered in Table 7 . Using weighted population growth, for example, the most significant increase in growth occurred in PUMAs in transition to a more ethnic character. Interestingly, the unweighted growth of areas that "stayed" Anglo was much higher; this is primarily because Anglos were moving into 762 URBAN AFFAIRS REVIEW / July 2001 the more sparsely populated outer suburbs and thus adding to a smaller initial base. Job growth was fastest in the Anglo-Anglo area; although this partly reflects a smaller base of jobs to begin with, there are no differences in the relative pattern if we use unweighted rather than weighted job growth. Job density (the number of jobs per 100 residents of working age [between 18 and 64 years]) was actually highest in the ethnic-ethnic areas; these areas are the heart of the central city, where many jobs may actually be held by commuting suburbanites, especially in the central business district and some higher-end manufacturing. Only the Anglo-Anglo areas saw job density rise significantly between 1980 and 1990; because this was accompanied by the sharpest group decline in percentage blue collar, the pattern suggests a boom in office-style employment in the more Anglo "suburbs." Although the forces of deindustrialization induced a fall in percentage blue collar for the county as a whole, the Anglo-ethnic transition areas actually saw an increase in this variable: In essence, a white working class was moving away and being replaced by an even more working-class black and brown population. As can be seen by the data for the ethnic-ethnic and significant transition areas, this ethnic working class is experiencing relatively impoverished conditions, including the slowest job growth and the highest Change in % % Anglo, 1990 Anglo, 1970 -1990 Anglo poverty rates. Indeed, the trends in relative income between the neighborhood types highlight the "widening divide" first noted in Los Angeles by Ong et al. (1989) : Over the 1970s and 1980s, the income in Anglo-Anglo areas drifted further up and away from the county mean, but income in ethnic and significant transition areas fell further and further away from the average.
19
How would the picture look if we adopted another reasonable characterization of ethnic change/transition? Borrowing from a recent study by Pastor, Sadd, and Hipp (2001) , I calculated the degree of ethnic change as the absolute sum of the percentage changes in ethnic composition. 20 The advantage of this is straightforward: An area that underwent a significant shift from 80% African-American and 20% Latino to 20% African-American and 80% Latino would be counted as having stayed ethnic under the previous categorization but would rank highly on what Pastor, Sadd, and Hipp term "ethnic churning." If such rapid shifts in ethnic composition weaken the bonds of social capital, this may erode community strength and neighborhood performance and lead to large geographic differences in economic outcomes.
As it turns out, little is gained by breaking the PUMAs in this fashion. Arranging the PUMAs into thirds by degree of ethnic transition, job growth Anglo, 1990 Anglo, 1970 -1990 Figure 5: Ethnic Transition by Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA), Los Angeles County, 1990 was virtually the same across the areas. There were differences in poverty, college education, and household income, but this seems to reflect the underlying clusters identified earlier: Virtually all the Anglo-stayed Anglo areas were "low-churning" PUMAs (and they were also nearly all of the low-churning areas); all the Anglo-big transition areas were "high churners"; 75% of the average-transition, now Anglo areas were "average churners"; and 14 of the 15 average-transition, now ethnic neighborhoods were either medium or high churners, with little noticeable difference in key economic or demographic variables between these two categories.
The only group where churning and our earlier categorization did not line up neatly was the set of ethnic-stayed ethnic PUMAs. In this grouping, three areas were low churners, whereas two areas experienced average churning and one area experienced high churning. Of the average/high churners, two experienced a demographic shift from African-American to Latino (South Vermont and Central Avenue), and one shifted from an Anglo/AfricanAmerican mix to an African-American/Latino mix (Compton). Comparing this more dynamic group with the low churners, I found virtually no difference in population growth, college education, current ethnic composition, or median household income. The average/high churners in this small subsample did experience much higher job growth (16% vs. -3%) and somewhat higher poverty rates (33% vs. 25%), a pattern that likely reflects the working poverty typical of the Latino in-migrants to these three PUMAs (Pastor 1995) .
21
Thus, our earlier categorization seems sufficient for illustrating one aspect of the "L.A. story": Los Angeles County is really an area of many different "cities," with the boundaries of ethnic and economic experience not neatly congruent with political jurisdictions or more traditional city-suburb distinctions. Indeed, a city-suburb breakdown can mask key trends that could feed into finding commonalities by race, class, and more specific geographyand building political alliances throughout the county may therefore involve not municipal leaders but rather new social actors working at a community level in the more distressed areas highlighted by our PUMA analysis.
THE EVOLUTION OF DIFFERENCE
As Pulido (1998) stressed, the social topography of Los Angeles County is not simply a result of random individual choices across an undifferentiated social landscape. Instead, racial settlement patterns in the county were established from the beginning of the century through restrictive housing covenants. As in many other areas of the United States, these initial institutional structures were exacerbated by federal mortgage programs and commercial lending practices that explicitly or implicitly discriminated against minorities (see also Laslett 1996, 55) .
But although these various programs and policies may help to explain the ethnic concentrations in Los Angeles as of 1970, they offer less insight into the changing patterns evidenced over 1970 to 1990. By this time, after all, housing covenants had been eliminated by both federal and state laws, and federal mortgage discrimination had become less explicit. Although one can certainly evoke cumulative causation-that is, past discrimination simply solidifies into fixed living patterns-this cannot be a complete explanation.
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To tease out the history of minority move-in more formally, I conducted a simple set of logistic regressions in which the dependent variable took on a value of 1 for various demographic changes over the two-decade period and 0 otherwise, and the independent variables in the regression represented initial conditions, such as prior residential stability, the percentage of blue-collar workers in the area labor force, initial household income, and beginning percentage minority. The predicted directions of effect were as follows: A more residentially stable area (over the previous five years) was likely to lead to less possibility for minority move-in, blue-collar and poorer areas were more likely to gain minority residents, and a higher existing minority population suggested that the area might have less social barriers to further minority move-in. This last variable reflects the notion of cumulative causation; if the other variables are significant and the regression can explain most of the variation even when the variable is removed, this suggests that other factors were operating besides simply past history.
In testing for these effects, I used two possible dependent variables. Transition to ethnic area was 0 for "Anglo-Anglo" and "average-transition, now Anglo" PUMAs and 1 for PUMAs that experienced an average or significant transition to an ethnic area; the areas that were ethnic and stayed that way were ruled out from the regression. Degree of ethnic change was similarly constructed but removed both the "Anglo-Anglo" areas and the "ethnic-ethnic" areas from consideration as these were both stable. 23 The results are depicted in the panels in Table 8 ; for each of the dependent variables, I present results for a regression without the initial ethnic composition and then for a regression, which includes this measure as well as the economic, class structure, and stability measures.
Note first that the explanatory power is generally quite high, as indicated by both the pseudo-R 2 and the percentage of cases predicted correctly. Moreover, the overall regression is nearly as successful even when initial-area ethnicity is not taken into account-and although the other variables often lose their significance, the sign and general coefficient pattern are similar even when initial ethnicity is included. The relatively strong results for the residential stability measure across the panel (given the small sample size) may be somewhat time specific: This variable measures the percentage of residents who had lived in the same house for the previous five years-in this case, the period between the 1965 Watts riots and 1970 in which "white fright" and then "white flight" opened up the space for new minority residents through southern and central Los Angeles. Still, the overall pattern of regression results is consistent with more general accounts of L.A. demographics: The older, poorer, and more working-class districts were the most likely locations for significant ethnic transition.
24
Of course, this demographic transition was not a simple or unidimensional process, as illustrated by the cases presented in Table 8 . Certain places, such as Long Beach, do show a demographic evolution paralleling the county as a whole: a steady decline in the percentage Anglo accompanied by increases in the representation of the three other major ethnic groups. Inglewood, however, shows rapid white flight between 1970 and 1980 with concurrently rapid African-American move-in; over the 1980s, however, Latino growth seemed to have been squeezing the remaining Anglo population. Bell Gardens shows a straightforward and dramatic pattern of Latino growth and Anglo decline; Monterey Park, a suburb in the San Gabriel Valley, shows the rapid growth of Asians and a consequent reduction in the Anglo population.
The Watts area shows an African-American/Latino transition, a pattern of "displacement" that has made for sharp social tensions between the two poorest ethnic groups in the county. Finally, Carson is the rarest of cases either in L.A. or elsewhere: A relatively even balance of major ethnic groups has persisted here with no major "tipping" even after the initial 1970-1980 mass departure of Anglos.
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A complete analysis would go well beyond the statistical exercises above. The forces that have set the parameters for the more recent demographic and economic trajectories have long been in motion. The inclusion of suburbs within the city of Los Angeles has much to do with the city's annexation of vast swaths of land, particularly in the San Fernando Valley, in the early part of the twentieth century (Dear 1996; Laslett 1996; Soja and Scott 1996) . The profusion of separate suburbs cobbled out of previously unincorporated county territory was aided in the 1950s and 1960s by the "Lakewood system" in which municipalities could contract with the county for essential services (Fulton 1997) and, some would argue, was driven in part by racial and class dynamics. 26 Of course, the polycentric and shifting ethnic character of the region and the city has been stressed by all these analysts, and so the statistical profiles 
COMMUNITY AND REGION
In this study, I have tackled a seeming conundrum: Los Angeles County seems to be a place where city and suburb share many demographic and economic features, but these commonalities have nonetheless not provided Pastor / REGIONALISM IN LOS ANGELES 771 especially fertile ground for the new regionalist or smart-growth movements that have taken root in Portland, Minneapolis, and elsewhere. To understand why, I attempted to recompose the county's geography, focusing first on an inner-city, rest-of-county breakdown and then a categorization based on ethnic change and transition. The first of these-which essentially moves the city's internal suburbs out and draws in the immediately adjoining inner-ring suburbs-indicates deep geographic divisions similar to those in East Coast cities. The second reveals even sharper divergences and suggests one of the reasons why the municipal-level alliances have been so difficult to achieve in the L.A. area: The actual commonalities may exist more along the lines of race, class, and specific subgeographic units. This analytical deconstruction of the county may point to some of the divisive factors behind its literal deconstruction, such as the historic emergence of incorporated cities under the Lakewood plan and the recent secessionist moves in L.A. City's San Fernando Valley area. Yet it also suggests the possibilities for a new equity-oriented regional politics and policy making in Los Angeles. Searching for smart-growth alliances and finding few of them does not mean that progressive regionalism has no possibilities; rather, the "L.A. story" suggests that the basis for such a movement may lie in the broad swath of poor communities across the region as well as certain subregional common interests.
Although organizing poor people across a region is notoriously difficult, Los Angeles can boast of some significant recent successes. The Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE), an activist-led coalition stressing the growth of working poverty in Los Angeles, pressured the city of Los Angeles in 1997 to adopt a living wage ordinance; in 1999, the county followed suit with its own more limited version, and LAANE has moved on struggles in Santa Monica and elsewhere in the region. In general, union activities have been impressive, with the 1999 organizing of 74,000 largely immigrant home care workers constituting the biggest single gain of union workers in recent years and the April 2000 janitor's strike being a signal event for U.S. labor. 27 A particular focus of labor organizing has been on the working poor who, as indicated in Figure 6 's breakdown of PUMAs by the thirds with the lowest, highest, and middle rates of working poverty, tend to be geographically concentrated in areas highlighted by our earlier analysis, a fact that has led certain labor unions to organize in employees' communities as well as their workplaces. 28 Indeed, there may be real hope for a "subregional," geographically based approach that would link the troubled areas of the city (and not the city as a whole) with the adjacent economically challenged inner-ring suburbs and unincorporated areas. Municipal-level organizing along these lines has been given some boost by the efforts of the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG) to help subregional groups of cities come together to identify the industrial clusters that drive their local economies and use this information to attract firms, shore up investment, and better tap into such regional opportunities. 29 An equally important set of actors consists of activist community organizations, many of whom have jumped municipal boundaries and tackled key regional institutions such as the Air Quality Management District, the Metropolitan Transit Authority, county government, and multicity special authorities.
The Alameda Corridor Jobs Coalition, for example, is a collection of community-based organizations, churches, and neighborhood groups that include poorer communities in Los Angeles and community groups in the adjacent cities of the southeast. This coalition arose in response to the Alameda Corridor Project, a $2 billion effort to build a high-speed rail line from the ports to downtown warehousing operations right through the heart of South L.A. Although promising great benefits for the region, the corridor project actually promised few jobs for local residents either in construction or export firms. 30 In response, the coalition successfully lobbied the multicity Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority for a commitment to place local residents in training slots and allocate 30% of the total hours for new hires; as a result, the corridor project reportedly now has the largest local hiring plan of any public works project in the contemporary history of the United States. 31 Of course, the demographic character of our breakdowns and an overlay of our ethnic change variables on the distress maps of Figures 1 and 6 suggest that any new equity-oriented regional effort would also have to capture support from the "emerging majority" of the African-American, Latino, and Asian communities. These communities are growing in nearly every area of the county, and their members may be able to find common bonds based on a shared sense of past exclusion from political processes. At the same, Sonenshein (1994, 53) argued that "the missing piece, and a critical key to the puzzle of Los Angeles's future, is the potential role of liberal whites in minority coalitions." He suggested that such racial coalitions should appeal to a common good and build working alliances on bread-and-butter class and neighborhood concerns.
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Some organizations have indeed woven together the concerns of the poor and of people of color with a broad regional perspective. As noted in the introduction, the Labor-Community Strategy Center has managed to organize a largely minority bus riders union, which has, in turn, used a combination of legal and community pressure to force better bus service from the regional Metropolitan Transit Authority; although the issue was legally argued on civil rights grounds because of the ethnic character of the ridership, the changes benefited transit-dependent poor from all over the region, and the organizing was on a full regional scale.
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Other organizations have brought together innovative organizing about race and poverty at a subregional level. Communities for a Better Environment, for example, is tackling environmental degradation with a constituency that is largely Latino and a geographic coverage that targets a broad area of South L.A., including parts of the city, unincorporated areas of the county, and inner-ring suburbs such as Huntington Park. In 1996, the group sued the regional Air Quality Management District, forcing it to suspend a trading program that was concentrating pollutants in a minority neighborhood and subsequently inducing it to adopt a new set of "environmental justice" principles that cover the whole region.
AGENDA (Action for Grassroots Empowerment and Neighborhood Development Alternatives), an organizing group also based in south-central L.A., has likewise made the local-regional link. AGENDA has taken the lead in forming Metro Alliance, a coalition that brings together a subset of the region's poorer communities, mostly of color and mostly in South and West L.A., to press public and private decision makers for shifts in regional approaches to infrastructure spending (such as the Alameda Corridor project), the county's welfare-to-work program, and government subsidies key to new regionally significant development projects (such as the Dreamworks Studio in Los Angeles). The latter effort led to a landmark agreement with the new studio that is designed to provide training in the animation industry for inner-city residents, a prime example of making the link between distressed neighborhoods and regional economic opportunities.
34
Interestingly, what has taken less root in Los Angeles is the sort of "smart growth" or new regionalist political strategies typically suggested for other areas-increasing the links between city and suburban political leaders, creating coalitions of "have-not" suburbs against resource-rich ex-urbs, and adopting urban land boundaries as a way of redirecting growth. With the county's cities still fragmented and Los Angeles itself threatening to split, community-based organizations have often stepped into the vacuum left by municipal actors. Frequently based in areas where poverty, especially working poverty, is high, such groups have discovered that the best way to improve conditions in their own locale is by targeting and transforming regional policy. As such, they have begun to offer a new social justice approach to regionalism-and a new regionalist approach to social justice.
Both the smart-growth movement and these community-based but regionally focused efforts are nascent social phenomena, and they are likely to intersect and learn from each other in the coming decade in both Los Angeles County and the nation as a whole. Moreover, even community-based efforts will necessarily turn to the municipal tools and city arenas stressed by smart-growth advocates, as is evidenced by the living wage activities of the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy or the targeting of city-level subsidies by AGENDA.
However, the key point here is simply that such movements are not easily "seen" in an analysis that focuses mostly on cities, suburbs, and municipal actors. Shifting perspective can help researchers recognize the large numbers of community development corporations, community-based organizations, and labor unions coming together to offer new solutions for reconnecting their neighborhoods and constituencies to regional dynamics. 35 It remains too early to tell whether this sort of "community-based regionalism" will gain ground, but if it does, the innovative efforts in Los Angeles-an area where divisions are profound but the old city-suburb models do not fully fit-may help lead the way.
NOTES
1. This is quite different than the "chocolate city, vanilla suburb" story offered by Farley et al. (1978) , a characterization seemingly more appropriate to many major midwestern and eastern cities.
2. See Meyerson (1999) . 3. In his report on the Los Angeles metro region, Orfield (2000) did offer a finer agglomeration of suburb types, especially distinguishing the high-need communities, middle-class communities, and affluent suburbs from the central city of Los Angeles. Although this set of distinctions is helpful, the municipality-based analysis does not break out the various neighborhoods or areas of the city of Los Angeles, does not assign neighborhood types to important and densely populated unincorporated areas of the county, and yields some anomalous characterizations of key suburbs. As such, the work here fills in gaps and provides a useful complement to the Orfield perspective.
4. L.A. County is itself located in a larger Southern California metropolis; indeed, the regional authority, the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG), comprises five counties, of which L.A. is only one. I focus on L.A. County here for three reasons. First, much of the analysis below relies on the novel use of Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs); these are more geographically compact and sensibly drawn in L.A. than in the other four counties. Second, SCAG has limited power, and there are therefore few mechanisms for governance at the larger regional level; L.A. County, on the other hand, is a political jurisdiction, and looking for commonalities and alliances in this grouping of nearly 10 million residents certainly seems ambitious enough. Third, L.A. County is more anomalous than the other parts of SCAG. In response to a referee suggestion, we employed the same procedures we use for L.A. to two large parts of SCAG, Orange County and the Riverside/San Bernardino area. We found in Orange County that the central-city areas (Santa Ana and Anaheim) were much less Anglo and much poorer than in the rest of the county (39.2% Anglo and 14.5% poor in the central city vs. 71.9% Anglo and 6.7% poor outside, as of 1990). The differences for these variables were less pronounced in Riverside/San Bernardino but still exceeded Los Angeles County. In both the Orange and Riverside/San Bernardino areas, housing values were about 20% lower in the central-city area versus the higher central-city prices in Los Angeles County; central-city income was 22% lower than the rest of the area in Orange, 21% lower in Riverside/San Bernardino, and 17% in Los Angeles.
5. City housing prices are actually about 10% higher than in the rest of the county, suggesting a problem of affordability.
6. The database compilers were Norman J. Glickman, Michael Lahr, and Elvin Wyly of the Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University. The database was initially assembled under a Housing and Urban Development (HUD) contract to meet the data needs of the United Nations's Habitat II Conference (held in Istanbul in June 1996) and has been expanded in variable coverage since; I specifically used version 2.11A (September 22, 1997) . A large central city was one in which the population exceeded 500,000 in 1990; results are very similar if we include all of the 77 metro areas in the State of the Cities database.
7. Note that the percentage of the metro population living in the central city of Los Angeles is quite similar to the sample average for a similar variable; thus, we are on relatively safe ground comparing central-city/metro measures, the only ones available in this particular database, for L.A. and the rest of the sample. Indeed, the average percentage of residents in the metro area in the central city for Los Angeles is nearly identical to that of the average for the larger 77 metro-area sample.
8. This is not to say that unemployment, poverty, and income disparities are less severe in Los Angeles-after all, L.A.'s civil unrest was a general signal of the distress felt by many residents-but rather that these problems are more geographically spread.
9. For a general view of organizing urban African-Americans and Latinos into coalitions, see the various studies in Betancur and Gills (2000) .
10. The Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) contains the full individual responses from 5% of the population. Because tagging each person by his or her census tract location might make it possible to identify the individual, the U.S. Bureau of the Census tries to balance respondent confidentiality and geographic characterization by tagging each person with his or her residence in a broader unit labeled a PUMA.
11. PUMAs are not always perfectly contiguous and may contain tracts located in other areas of the county. However, these are relatively rare occurrences in the Los Angeles County set of PUMAs, which are far more compact and sensible than PUMAs in other major urban areas, including the surrounding counties; moreover, the distribution of noncontiguous tracts seems random, implying that our analysis is not sharply affected.
12. The series come from a database prepared by the California State Department of Finance (DOF). Use of the DOF database was key because it offers consistent geographic tract coverage-a large number of the tracts change shape and population over time as tracts merge and split between census years, and cross-linking the regular census data without tract reconciliation would yield inaccurate results.
13. In connecting the PUMA designations with the DOF database, there are a series of methodological problems. The most significant is that the listing for the PUMAs is for partial tracts. Because the employment and demographic data I use were only available at the whole tract level, I had to work at that level to attain consistency across data sets. Thus, when partial tracts were part of the same whole tract but assigned to different PUMAs, I assigned to the whole tract the PUMA number of the partial tract with the most residents. I then aggregated by whole tract to create a PUMA-match table, linked this file with whole tract-level data, and finally aggregated up to the PUMA. Another approach to constructing PUMAs from tracts involves using the partial tract with the most land area as the deciding factor in assigning a PUMA tag to a whole tract; this has the advantage of making cleaner maps, but we are interested here in the social and not the physical ecology. Once all whole tracts were tagged, PUMA categories were created in ArcView GIS, and the internal boundaries were dissolved to create the PUMA shapes shown in Figure 2. 14. As noted by a referee, a superior approach would involve designating communities as of 1970 rather than assuming continuity with the 1990 categories. However, there is no accepted aggregation of tracts for that earlier year, and creating one could introduce biases based on my priors; as a result, it seemed methodologically superior to use categories derived by the census.
15. The figures were obtained from the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG) census tract data for 1990 on the aggregate number of jobs per tract and also SCAG's 1980 job count by 1980 whole tract. The 1980 and 1990 tracts do not match perfectly, with some 1980 tracts combining into a single 1990 tract, some 1980 tracts splitting into two 1990 tracts, and a smaller number of tracts being created or spliced in a variety of different ways. I therefore created a reallocation program that placed 1980 measures into the relevant 1990 tracts and aggregated by the 1990 PUMA shapes. When two or more 1980 tracts combined into a 1990 tract, it was easy enough to add up employment and allocate the 1980 jobs level for the 1990 tract. More problematic was the case when a 1980 whole tract split into two or more whole tracts in 1990, a situation that required some formula to allocate the 1980 employment into each of the 1990 "child" tracts. To do so, I decided to take the 1990 employment in each of the 1990 "child" tracts, use this to calculate an employment share variable, and then use this variable to carry forward and split the 1980 employment across the "child" tracts.
16. See, for example, the city/suburban mapping employed in Clark (1996) . 17. In going from the city to the inner city, we have "moved out" slower growing suburban areas within the city and added fast-growing unincorporated areas adjacent to the city. This helps to explain why inner-city growth now tops the rest of the county when the growth of the central city of L.A. was actually slightly below the non-L.A. portion of the county.
18. Clark (1996) looked at ethnic transitions at a tract level but did not provide the "mapping" we explore here. For a broad view of the county as a whole, see Sabagh and Bozorgmehr (1996) .
19. The differences would be more dramatic if we used per capita income rather than median household income, primarily because the ethnic areas tended to have a larger household size. Median housing values follow a similar pattern with some recovery in the ethnic-ethnic areas, probably because of increasing rates of homeownership of recent Latino immigrants.
20. I thank an anonymous referee for pointing me in this general direction, by stressing the need to consider those communities that experienced African-American/Latino transitions.
21. I say in-migrants because a detailed count by PUMA of years in country for the foreign born suggest that these areas are not portals but rather second stops for many Latino immigrants.
22. Note, for example, that although many of the highly minority areas in 1970 either stayed minority through 1990 or experienced significant transition, places such as Sepulveda, Pomona, and South Gate were highly Anglo in 1970 but experienced a large change in the ensuing decades. Thus, despite the validity of demographic "tipping" as a theory of transition, we need more than the past level of minority residents to understand the evolution of our areas.
23. I also constructed a third dependent variable, which excluded both "Anglo-Anglo" and "ethnic-ethnic" areas and took the value of 1 only where an area experienced a significant transition (see the discussion earlier in the text). The results were similar, but the regression did poorly when ethnic composition as of 1970 was not included as an independent. I also tried a multinomial logit in which both the stable (Anglo-Anglo and ethnic-ethnic) areas were excluded and the variable ranged upward over three states: average transition, still Anglo; average transition, now ethnic; and significant transition to ethnic. The significance of the coefficients fell, with past minority presence not significant; in the regression that dropped this variable, the three 32. Raphael Sonenshein (1993) has eloquently discussed the previous African-American/Jewish alliances that helped pave the election of Tom Bradley and then sustained a key political base for his 20-year reign as mayor of the city. An additional issue for the rainbow approach is that it is generally focused on attaining political power, particularly in specific cities and communities. Although seizing the reins of local government can be an avenue to economic improvement, such an approach can also lead to an excessive focus on public-sector benefits and job opportunities. Given that the public sector is generally downsizing, this offers fewer prospects than a focus on shifting the terms of engagement in the private sector, a task more suited to unions, community-based organizations, and other vehicles for empowerment.
33. With the help of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the bus riders union sued the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) for violating civil rights by shifting resources from the largely minority bus system to the more Anglo and middle-class rail system; a consent decree in 1996 forced the MTA to put more buses on the street, restrain fare increases, and generally improve service.
34. A detailed and more discursive discussion of all these community-based organizations is available in Pastor et al. (forthcoming) .
35. See, for example, the work of the Delaware Valley Community Reinvestment Fund (Nowak 1997) as well as the efforts of the St. Louis-based Metropolitan Congregations United (Rusk 1998) or the Baltimore Citizens Planning and Housing Association (Lutton 1997) . One of the first to coin the phrase "community-based regionalism" to describe these efforts was Bernstein (1997) .
